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**DEVELOPING AN INTERIM STRATEGY AND  
FORCE STRUCTURE IN THE FACE OF  
CHANGE AND UNCERTAINTY**

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2 APRIL 1990**

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## SECTION I

### UNCERTAINTY AND CHANGE AS DOMINANT ELEMENTS

The times are out of joint and likely to become even more so. The velocity and impacts of worldwide change mock our attempts to keep up with events, much less extract "essential truths" to serve as the bedrock for new national policies and supporting military strategies. So profound and open-ended is the continuing upheaval<sup>o</sup> that a healthy uncertainty appears to be the only appropriate outlook in developing an interim strategy and force structure to serve until we can project the direction of events with more confidence.

Five Year Defense Plans (FYDP) implement force structures. These plans involve huge resource commitments to raise, train, and maintain forces<sup>i</sup> and to design, test, procure, and maintain the equipment and supplies for their support and use. What kind of basis does change and uncertainty offer for doing that? The answer is that accepting uncertainty as the norm is the only answer that makes any sense right now. If we can identify the currents of major change (if not their outcomes), and then assess the extent of our uncertainties (and associated risks), then we should be able to build an interim strategy (or strategies) and supporting force structure which attempts to accommodate multiple threats at an acceptable level of risk within our expected means.

Some refuse to accept uncertainty as a legitimate condition under which to fashion strategies and structures. If that perspective is valid then presumably we can somehow substitute certainty for uncertainty. But how? Can we be sure of how long

it will be before a more or less permanent political and economic structure arises in the USSR? Can we foresee its nature? Can we postulate future Soviet policies with any real confidence in the face of daily societal evolutions that border on revolution? Are we confident of what imminent German unification will mean? Or can we predict the outcome when an economically united Europe embraces a newly unified Germany? In Asia, are we so certain of the impacts of growing Indian and Japanese military establishments and, especially, the potential for that capability to affect intent?

In Asia -  
seems to me -  
the uncertainty  
there is not  
so far out  
of line with  
the "muddled"  
uncertainty.

In the face of so many questions without answers, certainty will only replace uncertainty <sup>via</sup> in word games. In fact, the only real certainties at this point are the success of containment and the prospect for continuing uncertainty in the wake of that success.

The difficulty some have in accepting uncertainty as a legitimate and even dominant element in a new strategic calculus grows out of Cold War conditioning. For over forty years "threat" was virtually synonymous <sup>with</sup> for "Warsaw Pact" or "Soviet" threat in most minds. At the same time, analysts had come to exert a powerful influence in determining the probable effectiveness of individual systems and even whole forces using a highly quantified representation of this Soviet threat. In contrast, the future will require recognition of multiple diverse threats, and will demand <sup>that</sup> much-increased analytical effort be devoted to their qualitative as well as quantitative aspects.

but too  
was  
probably a  
mistake.

But if we accept ~~that~~<sup>as</sup> uncertainty and change ~~are~~<sup>are</sup> the principal elements in a new strategic calculus, then we must gauge the extent of that uncertainty and the nature of the various major changes which are underway at home and overseas.

## SECTION II

### A NEW NATIONAL AGENDA; CHANGING PRIORITIES AT HOME

There is an emerging domestic consensus around a new set of national priorities. Both the list of priorities as well as their relative ranking differ substantially from the set which prevailed at Ronald Reagan's inauguration ten years ago.

This list of domestic priorities, which constitutes virtually a new national agenda, affects the formulation of strategy and supporting structure choices in several ways. First, the relative ranking which the public accords to military threats obviously has a direct effect on subsequent Congressional authorization and appropriation. Second, and less obvious, is the effect which the relative ranking of priorities has in "tilting" policy makers' international perspectives. When concerns based on military threats and foreign developments score high on the public conscious (as they did until the last year or so) then, in general, policy makers are more likely to adopt an activist and interventionist global policy with an appropriate military component.

And I agree with this, I may be a substantial proportion -

- (1930's) have been highly visible military threats, yet U.S. was isolationist (public move from London)

If, on the other hand, the public signals little concern with questions of foreign military threat or overseas conflicts, then, in general, policy makers will be more likely to opt for a more conservative, less intervention-prone international <sup>positive</sup> outlook. When, as is the case now, the public ranks virtually all major concerns above the fear of foreign military threats, then the conditions are ripe for the reemergence of <sup>what I might be called</sup> neo-isolationist tendencies. As indicated on the chart below (which was extracted from the September 1989 Business Week) it is possible for the first time since the national election of 1940 that neo-isolationist policy views could find strong public support.

*I dislike  
perpetuating  
isolationism  
but do  
have a  
more positive  
instinct*

"How concerned are you about each of the following problems?"

|   | Very<br>Concerned | Some-<br>what | Not<br>Very | Not At<br>all | Not<br>sure |
|---|-------------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| Illegal drug use                                    | 86%               | 9%            | 2%          | 2%            | 1%          |
| Rising Crime  | 82%               | 14%           | 2%          | 1%            | 1%          |
| Spread of Aids                                      | 75%               | 19%           | 3%          | 3%            | 0%          |
| Environmental Threats<br>(including infrastructure) | 65%               | 27%           | 5%          | 2%            | 1%          |
| Plight of the Homeless                              | 65%               | 27%           | 5%          | 2%            | 1%          |
| Threat of Nuclear War                               | 42%               | 29            | 17%         | 12%           | 0%          |

*I'm  
surprised  
it's that  
high.* →

A number of other recent domestic polls strongly support the conclusion that the public considers threats to our economy to be both more likely and more dangerous to the nation than it does any potential military threats. In fact, eliminating the "twin deficits" and strengthening our economic health may well be the number two public concern, ranking just behind the drug issue.

As a part of this emerging focus on the economy and quality of life, there appears to be widespread agreement that our economy will be increasingly controlled by others. In the case of Japan, public perceptions border on classifying the Japanese as outright "enemies" because of their perceived unfair trade and economic practices. No matter what the realities of the Japanese-American economic interrelationship really are, public perceptions are hostile. Unless these perceptions are moderated they may force policy choices on Capitol Hill and in the <sup>Japanese</sup> Diet which are in neither nation's interest.

Public attitudes on such factors as acceptable levels of military casualties, an insistence on "just" objectives, and strict limits on the relative length of overseas military campaigns constitute a second set of highly restrictive factors which introduce additional uncertainties into our calculus. These restrictions have significant qualitative impacts on such things as training standards, the relative proportion of "elite" highly-trained and ready units within the overall structure, and the importance of a continuous and effective national intelligence gathering effort, to name only three examples.

What does this broad and still-forming domestic consensus portend for the future strategic and structural choices we must make? It doesn't require brilliance to add ~~the fact that the~~ public is <sup>opportunity</sup> ~~opposed~~ to further federal borrowing to the fact that ~~the public is~~ <sup>people are</sup> overwhelmingly focused inward on matters close to home and ~~arrive at the conclusion that~~ <sup>wishing to denigrate</sup> a very much smaller share

of the budget pie <sup>to</sup> ~~will be available for~~ military expenditures. But the political arithmetic doesn't end there. The economy is a major focus, and there are growing public perceptions that we are, in fact, protecting our major economic competitors while they attack the quality of our lifestyles with impunity. It ~~is~~ <sup>does</sup> not ~~important~~ <sup>matter</sup> that most media assertions claiming that the funds expended to maintain our fleets and garrisons in Europe and Asia could be better spent elsewhere are inaccurate, ~~and ignore cold~~ ~~fiscal realities~~--the public perceptions created by such claims can do lasting damage.

Domestically, then, we face ~~substantive~~ <sup>to the extent of</sup> uncertainties as negative shifts ~~continue~~ in public attitudes affecting both the gross share of resources likely to be made available for military use as well as the nature and the scope of <sup>public support for</sup> future <sup>military</sup> involvements, ~~which the public would be willing to support.~~

Not surprisingly, there has been a corresponding change in Congressional attitudes. Legislators (like other participants in the calculus) are frustrated, and their desire to resolve uncertainty and make sense of change are at the center of the current Capitol Hill discord over how much of what kinds of military capability is "enough". While preservation of constituent jobs, funding--and votes--remains a dominant priority, there is growing clamor for a more "logical" presentation of military requirements supported by a more "relevant" strategy which would somehow accommodate change and resolve uncertainty. While major force structure reductions are

seems to me  
that the  
direction of  
Δ is clear -  
here the  
time is how  
far I will  
go?



inevitable, a convincing presentation of a new strategic framework is crucial to heading off a feeding frenzy of uncoordinated and debilitating legislative reductions in military authorizations and appropriations. Identifying the types and extent of the potential threats which may lie ahead is a beginning in developing that revised strategic framework.

*I may change my mind as I read further, but I seem to me that you might do Sec. III before Sec. II - discuss the nature of inter. D which is reflecting public opinion.*

### SECTION III

#### A NEW INTERNATIONAL SCENE: CHANGING PRIORITIES OVERSEAS

Mikhail Gorbachev has performed stunning surprise after stunning surprise, and our longstanding public consensus supporting a strong national defense was an early casualty. If from now on <sup>he</sup> he does no more than remain in office and attempt to consolidate change, he will have pulled the most surprising rabbit of all from the magic hat. No matter the outcome, or the fact that he was probably compelled to action by ruinous alternatives, he will surely be remembered as the supreme catalyst of political change in the last quarter of this century.

But we should remind ourselves first that we are, for the moment, dealing from a position of strength in the aftermath of the victory of containment. Second, we need to recognize that the victory has triggered an international dynamic that is still unpredictable. As a result, in the last several years Europe has truly become a continent without constants. The familiar signposts of the cold war are titled and in jeopardy if not

already down. As a result of a succession of Soviet actions, German decisions are central to both Soviet, U.S., and European political, economic, and military security choices. This means that barring an incredible reversal of recent European events, it will not be an allied process or even a multi-party process, but an internal German process which will be the dominant influence in shaping the economic, political, and military changes underway in Europe.

The phenomenon of German unification is undoubtedly the single most potent generator of change and uncertainty on the international scene. Economic uncertainties generated by this rapidly changing German phenomenon vie with alliance issues for top billing on the agenda of east-west security concerns. The questions are endless. What impact will a united German state have on EC '92? Will German inflation resulting from the replacement of GDR marks and the financing of eastern reconstruction damage the international economy or threaten U.S. capital needs? Will eastern European markets develop as a positive force for Western economies or will they divert existing flows of capital from Southern Europe and elsewhere? Will Germany dominate central and Eastern Europe within a new economic order?

The political and military questions are, if anything, more numerous and the answers even less discernable at this point. Will a resurgent and united Germany long accept foreign garrisons or foreign controlled nuclear weapons in the absence of a

*Do you mean  
military presence?*  
*I'd put it that way,  
then ask whether/ to what  
extent ~~it is~~ <sup>it is</sup> ~~possible~~ <sup>possible</sup> ~~to influence~~ <sup>to influence</sup> ~~Germany~~ <sup>Germany</sup>  
~~on military.~~*

convincing Soviet threat? Is U.S. presence and influence in Europe dependent on retaining garrisons in Germany? Can Germany be coaxed into joining and remaining a part of some sort of larger security structure that will help ensure that she continues to nurture democratic and free market institutions? Will Germany retain a large military establishment after unification (In this regard, decisions made during the unification process must be regarded as tentative at best until the first German national elections after unification ratify those decisions). Is there really a long term future for NATO, or is the alliance likely to be absorbed into a larger security structure to which we become <sup>or do not become</sup> a party? Will a unified Germany tolerate Soviet garrisons for an extended period? And, is neutrality really an option for the Germans?

Soviet jettisoning of both ideology and the former Eastern European satellites has opened up a Pandora's box of new policy uncertainties. It <sup>may</sup> ~~has~~ <sup>permit</sup> ~~also resulted in~~ <sup>inclusion</sup> several judgements which <sup>would</sup> ~~will~~ aid in arriving at an interim strategy and supporting force structure. First, the risk of nuclear <sup>war(?)</sup> ~~is~~ substantially lower. Second, while by no means eliminated, the potential for a Soviet invasion of Western Europe is increasingly less likely and decreasingly achievable without an extended period of visible Soviet preparation and Western warning. Third, in the event of conflict the Soviets lack military allies in Eastern Europe and, in <sup>many</sup> ~~some~~ cases, <sup>would</sup> ~~could~~ face actively hostile post-communist regimes. Thus, while Moscow retains an enormous nuclear arsenal

*what do  
we do  
with  
nuclear  
power?*

and an intact and capable Red Army, the threat of superpower conflict in Europe has diminished and appears likely to continue to do so.

But for Moscow the price of reduced tension in Europe has been increased tension at home. An imploding economy in the midst of exploding public debate poses grave internal challenges. Price reform, necessary to transitioning to a free market, will involve a further sharp decline in living conditions. At the same time, long repressed secessionist/nationalist sentiments are inflaming the periphery, fed by the newfound tolerance for pluralism and public debate. How will the recent concentration of powers in the newly created presidency affect this course of events? Will the outcome be a relatively peaceful transition to a market-like economy and some sort of pluralism system? Or, will it be a return to a brutal oligarchy not unlike the Romanovs? Nothing is yet certain.

Overshadowed by the dramatic developments in Europe, the process of major change which is underway in Asia is no less fundamental to our future security interests. Burgeoning Japanese economic might and simmering trade disputes with the United States sometimes mask other issues with important security implications. Can we structure a mutually advantageous and even-handed technology exchange with Japan in the face of much publicized and highly emotional trade friction? If not, is there a substitute for such a relationship to support essential defense and wider industrial needs? Can we preserve the mutual security

is it the  
issue really  
wider than  
that? who  
is us?

treaty if the Soviet Union engineers a return of the Northern Territories? Can we preserve this long standing security relationship in the face of an American public which is increasingly hostile toward Japan? At what point does growing Japanese military capability begin to influence Tokyo's intent? Given the probability that the U.S. and Europe may both be seeking large inputs of capital at the same time, how much future financial leverage will we cede to Tokyo in return for continued financing of our debt? And, what is the basis for maintaining a substantial U.S. military presence in Asia? Is it current trade? Or is it access to future markets? Is it our status as a "pacific power?" Or is it treaties? Is it the notion of the U.S. as a sort of balancing wheel against regional hegemonies? Is it a surviving commitment to containing still powerful Soviet Pacific forces? Or, is it something less concrete--e.g., a historical and emotional tie colored by a conviction that Japanese policies are more easily influenced within rather than outside the de facto alliance?

There is widespread Asian mistrust of Japanese intentions, a condition which generates pressures for a continued U.S. presence as the only powerful player without regional ambitions. That same mistrust of Japanese intentions is also at least partially responsible for a widespread trend <sup>among Japan's neighbors</sup> toward acquisition of military capabilities which are more appropriate for regional power projection than for maintaining national territorial integrity.

Specifics?

In the short run China is likely to remain an orthodox Communist dictatorship--perhaps the last other than Cuba. The aging Communist regime faces the difficult task of continuing economic development without losing political control. But time is very short for D<sup>e</sup>ng Xiaoping and the remaining veterans of Mao's "Long March," and while the recent brutal suppression of the student-led movement for democracy purchased a reprieve, actuarial tables deny any possibility that the respite will be a long one. In the meantime, the budget increase granted to the Army as the "fourth modernization" may indicate payment for services rendered in Tiananmen Square. It may also argue for a more powerful future role for the military in the leadership, a development which could substantially delay achievement of internal reforms and pose substantial security challenges to U.S. interests in Asia. China's continuing regional disputes with India on her western border and Viet Nam to the south raise additional uncertainties on the Asian giant's future course. In the meantime, the current leadership is likely to become increasingly hostile to both superpowers, <sup>to</sup> Moscow because of the Kremlin's perceived "abandonment" of socialism, and <sup>to</sup> Washington because of perceived "interference" in strictly Chinese internal matters.

In its recent Note, Long Term Military Trends, 1950-2010, the Rand Corporation gives heavy emphasis to the relative position which China and Japan may occupy in our future strategic thinking. "In light of these forecasts of long term economic and

military trends, and recognizing the uncertainties surrounding them, a general conclusion emerges: the latter part of the present century and the early part of the 21st century will be characterized by a continuing shift of economic and military power toward the Pacific Rim countries. Consequently, it may well be that the orientation of Japan and China toward the United States and each other--whether they are allied, friendly, neutral, or belligerent--will be no less important for U.S. interests than is the continued adversarial posture of the Soviet Union." The message remains significant despite its publication prior to the upheavals in Eastern Europe.

India is also increasingly assertive. New Delhi's recent interventions in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and the rapidly emerging power projection capabilities of the Indian Navy add yet more uncertainties in the Southwest Asian theater through which the West's oil lifeline flows.

Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore are experiencing annual economic growth exceeding ten percent and are already major competitors in many industries including sophisticated military hardware. They will be formidable economic competitors in the future. In both North and South Asia are we once again subsidizing opponents through extension of the American military umbrella? Is there another role that maintains U.S. influence in the giant oceanic theater at a lesser price? Can air and seapower substitute for the ground forces in South Korea? And,

again - I  
question whether  
there are  
really  
uncertainties in  
the USSR/C. Europe  
since  
Don't they rather  
tend to move  
in a particular  
direction?

can and will we permit acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea?

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) would attract little attention if it weren't for two geographical factors. First, the strategic ocean route over which passes most of Asia's oil, gas, and strategic minerals lies in waters disputed by Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. Included is the much discussed Strait of Malacca as the gateway to the Indian Ocean. Second, our naval presence in Asia is anchored in Yokuska to the North, and the base complexes at Clark and Subic in the South. The presence of these strategic southern bases in a Third World country still undergoing its nationalist revolution raises a set of issues extending far beyond the Philippines. Can we maintain an adequate Pacific presence (and Indian Ocean commitment) without one or both bases? What are the feasible alternatives, and what are the policy implications? Is an announced and immediate turnover of base sovereignty to the Philippines enough to insulate the facilities (and U.S. citizens) from the nationalistic conflicts flaring in the archipelago? Is subsequent leasing of support services a practical alternative? And, is U.S. South Asian policy in danger of becoming "Philippine base policy"?

While the uncertainty and change in Eastern Europe and the Balkans stems from Soviet abandonment of both ideology and empire, the uncertainties and often violent changes occurring on the fringes of the Moslem heartland stem from a vibrant drive for

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moved  
mostly the  
rest of the  
moved.



local Moslem political independence and control. The specific form and relative level of violence varies, but these independence movements in areas with Moslem majorities include Afghanistan, Kashmir, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Soviet Tadzhikistan. What are the implications of such destabilization? In the case of the West Bank, is a change in U.S. policy warranted? Is any negotiated settlement likely to be regarded by Moslem Arabs as only one of several steps in ultimately regaining control of all of the formerly Moslem territory and eliminating Israel (and her U.S. security guaranty)? Does Tehran really play a central role in fomenting Moslem violence, or should our security policy recognize a wider and more dispersed series of local nationalistic Moslem movements? And, what are our security interests in a potentially destabilized Soviet Central Asia?

*Does anyone really believe this?*

Although the last region for review, the middle east remains perhaps the "hottest" likely trouble spot. The potential for interruption of crucial middle East oil supplies, as well as the destabilization of friendly Arab regimes continues. The long standing hostility shown toward the Jordanian and Saudi monarchies and their conservative allies by the radical Arab regimes as well as Iran continues to pose clear and present security challenges for the United States and the industrial economies of the west with their continuing heavy dependence on fossil fuels.

But conventional measures of military threats are not the

only threats of violence which we are likely to face. Narcotics traffic, terrorism, and other low intensity conflicts will be prominent security concerns.

*But present actions on the supply side are really a "mission impossible".*

Despite the rhetoric, we have not yet effectively attacked either the supply or demand aspects of the narcotics threat. This vicious trade attacks the health and welfare of our own citizenry and its moral and economic vitality, as well as the stability of friendly regimes abroad. In confirmation of the danger, and as stated earlier in the discussion of an emerging domestic consensus, the American public regards narcotics trafficking as the number one threat to its way of life. Under such circumstances counter-narcotics capabilities will clearly be an element in the calculus leading to strategy and force structure choices, whether or not it is greeted enthusiastically by defense planners.

Finally, there are a variety of forms of low intensity conflict, including international terrorism. This last, the most virulent form of low intensity conflict, is nourished by several global conditions almost certain to extend well into the future.

Africa as well as large sections of Latin America and Asia will deteriorate so disastrously in the near future that huge fractions of the populations are likely to perish from starvation as well as pandemic waves of contagious diseases affecting whole countries. Why? Because these countries will be excluded from the principal trading blocks. Because they have few natural resources from which to develop industries and fuel economic

growth. Because most of the capital which might have ameliorated their condition through aid programs will be absorbed by Eastern Europe, debt servicing, and a privileged handful of Third World regimes favored by western nations. Because their starting levels of literacy, internal educational structures, and trained managers are inadequate to launch their societies into the modern international economy without a major infusion of outside assistance. And, because most are perceived by policy makers in developed nations as largely irrelevant to the international dialogue.

In the midst of such widespread suffering and cultural deterioration, global communications developments will ensure that the afflicted populations remain well aware that the situation is radically better in the "have" nations. This knowledge is likely to produce a steady flow of recruits to support a variety of terrorist activities, low intensity but long duration conflicts, para-military insurgencies, and narcotics trafficking efforts. The violence which these generate will inevitably threaten American interests.

In addition to the region-specific framework of trends and changes which could jeopardize future U.S. interests, there is also a handful of broader trends, particularly in the Third World, which will have major impacts on our future policies, strategies, and selection of an interim military force structure.

Industrialization in the Third World has created major arms export industries capable of producing sophisticated conventional

weaponry--and marketing it at prices which are often well below those of the major developed states. The vision of an unstable Third World awash in cheap but capable weapons gains substance as destitute reformist Eastern European governments begin to place large portions of their Soviet-supplied or designed armaments on the international auction block at bargain prices. That these offerings may well include unemployed former officers and skilled non-commissioned specialists for hire as mercenaries is a further cause for concern.

Potential concerns over Third World armament production and acquisition might be more easily shrugged aside as localized problems if it weren't for several additional factors. First, long range delivery systems, especially IRBMs, are under development or already in production and use by a number of "potentially unstable" Third World regimes. Second, "First World" countries (or their client states such as Israel) may share common borders with such regimes, or suddenly find that their major cities have become potential targets within range of the newly developed ballistic missiles. Third, chemical weapons are widely available. These weapons, in combination with the presence of long range delivery systems (and the precedent for employment set in the Iran-Iraq war), pose an especially lethal threat. Finally, membership in the nuclear club is growing less and less exclusive. As the membership list expands so does the potential for irresponsible behavior--with potentially disastrous consequences. The chart below was prepared by the Strategic

Studies Institute of the Army War College and published in A World 2010, A Decline of Superpower Influence. While it may overstate the extent of potential nuclear proliferation by 2010, it clearly underlines the gravity of the issue.

Post Industrial

Country (Weapons)

France (2000+)  
Japan (up to 500)  
United Kingdom (2000+)  
United States (2000+)  
West Germany (up to 500)

Industrial

Country (Weapons)

China (2000+)  
India (up to 1000)  
Pakistan (up to 1000)  
N. Korea (up to 500)  
S. Korea (up to 500)  
USSR (2000+)  
Vietnam (up to 100)

Advanced Industrial

Country (Weapons)

Israel (up to 1000)  
South Africa (up to 1000)  
Taiwan (up to 500)

Pre-Industrial

Country (Weapons)

Egypt (up to 50)  
Iran (up to 50)  
Iraq (up to 50)  
Libya (up to 50)  
Saudi Arabia (up to 50)

Transitioning Industrial

Country (Weapons)

Argentina (up to 50)  
Brazil (up to 50)

In addition to strictly military concerns, industrialization and unbalanced development in the Third World will also affect U.S. interests by intensifying the friction between rich and poor and contributing to a flood of immigration to the cities, producing potentially explosive and destabilizing situations for friendly regimes (e.g., Rio, Sao Paolo, Bueno Aires, Mexico City, etc.).

Finally, despite the good face often painted on the subject in public pronouncements, Third World industrialization already is and will continue to clash head-on with U.S. policies affecting markets, tariffs, credit, and matters of international finance. In this regard there is some truth to American popular perceptions that industrializing countries are consciously opting to pursue further growth at the expense of the standards of living in industrial and post-industrial nations. A premier example of such interests-in-conflict and its resulting potential for destabilization is Third World debt. The following quote from Rand Corporation's Note, Long-Term Economic and Military Trends, 1950-2010 illustrates the issue's policy consequences. "...how the international debt of more than \$1 trillion owed by the developing countries is managed--whether by gradual marking down and easing of servicing terms or by outright default, or by repatriation of capital in response to changes in internal economic policies or by new lending that contributes to increased exports by the debtor countries and their enhanced servicing capacities--will have a serious impact on economic growth in some of the major developing countries, as well as in the creditor countries. Of still greater significance in affecting...growth would be a sharp or cumulative increase in protectionist trade policies by the world's major trading countries or blocks: the United States, Japan, and the European Economic Community (EEC)."

isn't the  
purpose  
of this  
more  
truth?

Finally, the same Rand Note concludes that economic growth (industrialization) in combination with the increasing military capabilities of regional powers poses important questions for future U.S. interests. "Two important general conclusions emerge from combining the estimates of major economic trends in the military aggregates: first, looking forward to the rest of this century and the beginning of the 21st century, whether Japan and China are allied, friendly, neutral, or belligerent vis-a-vis the United States will be no less important for U.S. interests than is the continued adversarial posture of the Soviet Union; second, inasmuch as some of the middle-level regional powers are likely to gain in economic and military capabilities and are likely to be more prominent actors in the international arena, U.S. policy formulation will probably grow increasingly concerned with closer cooperation and coalitions with them."

A final factor affecting our future security is the role of technology. Access to technology, the maintenance of a broad basic research establishment, and the capacity for timely incorporation of technological developments into production lines are conditions essential to preserving both our economic and military security. Any interim strategy and force structure must recognize the critical importance of research and development as well as applied technology in furthering and safeguarding vital national interests.

*Unlike Sec. II, this  
Section in its introductory paragraph  
to argue rather free field without  
obvious connection to what follows. I'll see  
interested to see how you draw out  
the implications of this regional  
trend for force posture.*

SECTION IV  
THE BASIS FOR AN INTERIM  
STRATEGY AND SUPPORTING FORCE STRUCTURE

While our vital national interests as currently stated in the National Military Strategy still appear sound, there clearly is a whirlwind of domestic and international change that is reshaping the future security environment in which those interests must be protected. The uncertainty surrounding the outcome of those changes raises several questions. First, how long will it be before we can be relatively confident of the dominant long term security concerns which will confront us? Second, what are the indicators which will signify to us that events have begun to assume a relatively predictable direction--that certainty (with prudent risk) can replace uncertainty? And, third, given the range of threats and developments discussed in Section III, what do we do in the meantime?

How long will it be before we can project future security trends with a relative degree of confidence, and what are the indicators signifying that we have reached that point? The short answer is that it will probably be three to five years. ~~Why that number? It is only an educated guess, but~~ by that time it is reasonable to assume that the outlines of the future course of Soviet policy should be emerging from the current confusion surrounding economic, political, and military restructuring. A resumption of anti-western and anti-democratic military and political activity accompanied by a military force structure



expansion will carry with it a requirement for us to respond with an appropriate force structure and revised strategy (one more akin to the cold war with its focus on a single overwhelmingly dominant threat). If, on the other hand, pluralist and free-market influences moderate Soviet behavior and eventually result in commitment of available resources to nation-building within a much changed USSR, then we might fashion a smaller and very different force structure oriented principally to the non-Soviet threats discussed in Section III.

In the interim we will have to fashion the smaller force structure which the public has mandated so that we further our strategic objectives while minimizing risks. We might redefine those strategic objectives along the lines of these examples.

- o To strengthen national economic competitiveness as the principal guarantor of the quality of American life.

- o To encourage pluralism and free market principles without interfering in national self-determined efforts.

- o To encourage the peaceful conversion of the Soviet Union into several states whose philosophies and economic objectives are compatible with preservation of our own vital interests.

- o To preserve and expand the national technology base, and to support measures which provide comparative advantage in vital areas.

*including*  
~~o To preserve our~~ space-based technologies,

*this item  
out of place in  
the list - on  
a different level  
of specificity.*

o To maintain U.S. influence in all principal geographic theaters and to ensure continued access politically and economically in those theaters.

o To discourage the acquisition of nuclear and chemical weapons and long range delivery systems, especially by Third World nations, and to control or eliminate existing stocks.

o To encourage the development of economic and security structures which restrain the re-emergence of national military hegemonies in Europe or Asia.

o To ameliorate the health and environmental conditions supporting terrorism, low intensity conflict, and insurgencies in the Third World. And,

o To eliminate international narcotic trafficking. *Again, 24 hr the is painful.*

Defining a set of national policies and supporting means (including a military component) with which to achieve such objectives will be closely constrained by the new domestic priorities summarized in Section II. The difference between the total ~~resulting~~ requirement for military force and the array of force structure capabilities which we will be able to afford (active and reserve) constitutes risk. Such risk demands that the combination of implementing concepts and executing means which we select to support national policies be chosen with close attention to reducing this risk to the maximum extent practical.

Military risks can be reduced by a variety of means, not all of which are themselves military. In addition to the composition of the force structure and determination of force posture, such

means can include alliances, treaties, arms control, military aid, development of trade dependencies and other influencing arrangements, supra-national mutual security frameworks, etc. All of these are likely to be necessary during the interim period that will precede our gaining relative certainty of future Soviet intent.

In the specific case of force structure (and force posture), we must craft a structure which is capable of supporting major policy objectives at an acceptable level of risk while retaining the capability to rapidly expand if Soviet behavior fails the "intent test." And we must do so with reduced means. Principles which we might use in crafting the structure (and posture) could include those below.

- o Preserve strategic nuclear deterrence based on assured destruction and maintenance of relative strategic stability.

- o Retain selected logistics and staging bases, at least some corps headquarters, and selected air forces in Europe while encouraging NATO members not to demobilize entirely. This will help offset the risk of Soviet reversal and at the same time act to restrain the potential for development of German hegemony.

- o Preserve and modernize air and sea projection assets such as the C-17 transport and amphibious shipping as essential to worldwide response by a smaller force structure.

- o Place the highest priorities on improving national intelligence capabilities with emphasis on expanding HUMINT and the anticipation of threats in time to plan for and apply

discrete task-organized forces as needed. Include as a key element the achievement of a tighter integration of State Department, Department of Defense, and other assets in a much more responsive national reporting and analysis structure.

Bring the  
information  
pertaining to  
foreign policy

o While preserving rapid response capabilities, ensure that in the interim the active force structure retains sufficient heavy armor forces for rapid reinforcement of NATO until such time as Soviet long term intentions are clear. Ensure ready reserve units provide the remainder.

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o Delay selected major modernizations by postponing or slowing procurement for one to two years on systems such as the B-2, Seawolf, ATF/ATA, and SDI systems pending a determination on the direction of Soviet force development. Proceed with research and development to preserve the technology base and guard against the risk of technological breakthrough.

2-2  
2-4  
on 20  
page

o Pursue arms control with emphasis on stabilizing the strategic as well as European conventional force equations.

o Preserve the bilateral defense relationship with Japan as a method to slow Japanese rearmament, preserve American influence in Asia, and assure needed technology flows in the interim.

o To the maximum extent possible place any deactivated naval force projection assets in the reserve or in a quickly recoverable "mothball" status until such time as Soviet intentions are clear.

o Within a reduced conventional force structure, prevent further conversion of heavy forces into light forces until

assurance is provided that European reinforcement is no longer a possibility.

- o Attempt to draw the Soviets into a pan-European security framework to discourage re-emergence of military ambitions.

- o Ensure retention of intact task-organized, deployment-ready expeditionary forces, tailored for strategic deployment and sustainable without initial external resupply.

- o Use reserve units in low-intensity, long-duration nation-building commitments.

- o Preserve existing special operations capabilities. In the interim, combinations of improved intelligence capabilities and smaller, highly trained and ready force packages will have to substitute for deployment of larger conventional forces.

- o Include counter-narcotics related improvement of surveillance and interdiction capabilities as an integral part of a more responsive national intelligence package.

- o Include a strong research and development effort, even at the expense of foregoing fielding for some systems, in order to guard against the risk of technological breakthrough.

- o Slow further production and fielding of strategic nuclear systems until Soviet intent is clear (pace of modernization).

- o Consider gambits such as offering major debt relief to Third World nations in exchange for compliance with chemical and nuclear non-proliferation to reduce such threats.

— No matter the final shape of the reduced interim force structure which emerges from the budget process, that structure

*Final Dec 9  
might be more  
precise  
and it would  
be organized  
in 10 year  
segments, subdivided  
into categories  
something like  
military staff for inspection*

*in  
prime  
group*

must simultaneously meet the anticipated requirements in selected key areas while, in combination with other political and diplomatic measures, reducing the risks to an acceptable level where it cannot. If we can present a convincing case for a revised structure which meets this challenge, then we may be able to restore a broad consensus on military spending and its important contribution to national security.